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is pursuing a common law remedy which existed before the 
enactment of the statute and which continues to exist in cases 
not covered by the statute. It is incumbent upon the employer 
to prove that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a bar to the 
employee's ordinary remedy. [20b] There is no legal reason 
why this rule should not apply to Popejoy's action as well 
a~ to one by an employee against his own employer. 
'rhe judgment and the order denying the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 7, 
1951. 
[L. A. No. 21830. In Bank. lVIay 11, 1951.] 
.JOHAN RICHARD WALLACE SCHUMM, a Minor, etc., 
Appellant, v. PHIL BERG et al., as Executors, etc., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Illegitimacy-Support--Contract.-In an action by an illegiti-
mate minor against his father's estate for damages for breach 
of an oral contract entered into by the father and mother 
for the support and education of the child, defendant cannot 
successfully urge that the complaint alleges a contract entered 
into by plaintiff's mother as his agent, which is therefore void 
because a minor cannot give a delegation of power ( Civ. 
Code, § 33), where the whole tenor of the contract alleged 
points to its being the agreement of the mother for plaintiff's 
and her benefit, and no obligations are assumed thereunder 
by plaintiff. 
[2] Id.- Support- Contract.- In an action by an illegitimate 
minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an 
oral contract entered into by the father and mother for the 
[2] See 13 Cal.Jur. 936; 7 Am.Jur. 675. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 7-10, 12, 15, 22] Illegitimacy, § 19; 
[3,4,6,14] Illegitimacy, §23; [5] Pleading, §101; [11] Illegiti-
macy, § 21; [13] Contracts, § 98; [16] Frauds, Statute of, § 3; 
[17] Frauds, Statute of,§ 17; [18] Frauds, Statute of, § 23; [19] 
Frauds, Statute of, § 4; [20] Frauds, Statute of, § 27; [21] Elec-
tion of Remedies, § 2; [23] Abatement, § 7. 
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support and education of the child, defendant cannot success-
fully urge that plaintiff is the contracting party, and that his 
mother acted in a solely representative capacity in bargaining 
away his right of action against his father for support ( Civ. 
Code, § 196a), by agreeing not to institute a suit, where the 
mother's only agreement was that she would not institute 
a paternity suit during her pregnancy. 
[3] Id.- Support- Pleading.- In an action by an illegitimate 
minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an 
oral contract entered into by the father and mother for the 
support and education of the child, an allegation in the com-
plaint that before the contract the mother told the father 
that she was going to institute a suit in behalf of plaintiff is 
of little significance in establishing that she therefore con-
tracted as plaintiff's agent. 
[ 4] Id.- Support- Pleading.- In an action by an illegitimate 
minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an 
oral contract entered into by the father and mother for the 
support and education of the child, an allegation in the com-
plaint that plaintiff and his mother performed all the terms 
of the contract by them to bP performed, and an allegation 
that the mother alone did that, are at most a stating of differ-
ent theories. 
[5] Pleading-Demurrer-Determination.-If a complaint is sus-
tainable on any theory it is not vulnerable to a general de-
murrer. 
[6] Illegitimacy-Support--Pleading.-In an action by an illegiti-
mate minor against his father's estate for damages for breach 
of an oral contract entered into by the father and mother for 
the support and education of the child, defendant cannot suc-
cessfully urge that the contract constituted a compromise of 
a minor's claim which has not been approved by the court 
and is therefore invalid (Pro b. Code, § 1431), where the 
amended complaint added to the contract a clause stating that 
plaintiff's right to support is not abrogated and compromised 
by the contract. 
[7] Id.- Support- Contract. -An agreement under which the 
mother of an illegitimate child agrees not to institute paternity 
proceedings during her pregnancy, but remains free to do so 
after the birth of the child, is not a waiver of any of the 
child's rights before birth, but only an agreement not to prose-
cute them. 
[8] Id.-Support--Contract--Consideration.-In an action by an 
illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for 
breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and 
mother for the support and education of the child, defendant 
cannot successfully assert that there was no consideration for 
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the contract inasmuch as plaintiff is not bound thereby be-
cause it was not approved by the court as required by Prob. 
Code, § 1431, and therefore his father was not bound because 
there was no mutuality of obligation, where plaintiff is the 
third party beneficiary of the contract and no performance 
is required by him. 
[9] Id.-Support-Contract.-A provision in an oral contract 
entered into by the father and mother of an unborn illegiti-
mate child, that the mother "during the remainder of her ... 
pregnancy until the birth of said child shall institute no action 
or proceeding in any Court to establish judicially ... that 
[the father] is or will be the father of said child," clearly 
contemplates that the mother will not directly or indirectly 
cause litigation to be instituted involving the question of the 
father's paternity before the child is born. 
[10] Id.-Support-Contract.-The mother of an unborn illegiti-
mate child has an interest in maintaining an action for the 
support of the child during her pregnancy, since the obligation 
to support the child is imposed on both the father and mother 
( Civ. Code, § 196a), and in agreeing to refrain from suing 
she suffers a detriment. 
[11] !d.-Support-By Whom Action Brought.-The mother of an 
unborn illegitimate child has the legal right to bring an action 
for the child's support after conception and before birth. 
[12] Id.-Support-Contract-Consideration.-The promise of the 
mother of an unborn illegitimate child to name the child 
after the father is valid consideration for a contract whereby 
the father agrees to support the child. 
[13] Contracts-Consideration.-The validity of consideration for 
a contract does not depend on its value. 
[14] Illegitimacy-Support-Pleading.-In an action by an ille-
gitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for 
breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and 
mother for the support and education of the child, defendant 
cannot successfully urge that the complaint alleges a contract 
the consent of the father to which was obtained by threats of 
injury to his character, and that the contract alleged is there-
fore unenforceable, where the complaint alleges only that prior 
to the making of the contract the mother declared her intention 
of instituting a filiation action if the father did not acknowl-
edge paternity, and where a sufference by the father of un-
favorable publicity would only be an incident to that suit. 
[15] !d.-Support-Contract-Consideration.-In an action by an 
illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for 
breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and 
mother for the support and education of the child, it cannot 
be said that the contract alleged is so unconscionable and 
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shocking as to require an examination into the adequacy of 
the consideration, where it appears from the complaint that 
plaintiff is the illegitimate son of the decedent, who left an 
estate in excess of $2,000,000, and that plaintiff's mother is in 
penurious circumstances; where the promise to name plaintiff 
after the decedent and to forbear bringing a paternity action 
prior to his birth may have had great intrinsic value and where 
the obligation assumed by decedent was one imposed on him 
by law. (Civ. Code, § 196a.) 
[16] Frauds, Statute of-Agreements on Consideration of Mar-
riage.-In an action by an illegitimate minor against his 
father's estate for damages for breach of an oral contract 
entered into by the father and mother for the support and 
education of the child, defendant cannot successfully assert 
that the complaint alleges a contract which is unenforceable 
because made on the consideration of marriage and not in 
writing ( Civ. Code, § 1624(3); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(3)), 
where the reference to marriage in the contract was merely 
a recital that the mother and another were about to be mar-
ried, that on the birth of plaintiff after such marriage he would 
bear the surname of the husband, but that no liability was to 
be imposed on him for plaintiff's support. 
[17a, 17b] Id.-Promise to Answer for Debt of Another.-In an 
action by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for 
damages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the 
father and mother for the support and education of the child, 
defendant cannot successfully assert that the complaint alleges 
a contract within the statutes requiring a writing for a spe-
cial promise to answer for the debt of another ( Civ. Code, 
§ 1624(2); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(2)), where, from the terms 
of the contract, it is within the exception of the statutes, in 
that the father's promise to support plaintiff is an original 
obligation running to the mother upon the consideration that 
she will name the child after the father and refrain from 
bringing a paternity action. ( Civ. Code, § 2794( 4) .) 
[18] !d.-Promises on Consideration Beneficial to Promisor.-
Whenever a promise to answer an antecedent obligation of 
another is made upon a fresh consideration beneficial to the 
promisor, no matter from what source it may move, the prom-
ise is an original one and valid though oral; whenever the 
leading and main object of the promisor is not to become 
surety or guarantor of another, but to subserve some purpose 
or interest of his own, his promise is not within the statute of 
frauds, although the effect of the promise may be to pay the 
debt or discharge the obligation of another. 
[18] See 12 Cal.Jur. 869; 49 Am.Jur. 426. 
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[19] !d.-Agreements not Performed in Lifetime.-In an action 
by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for dam-
ages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the father 
and mother for the support and education of the child, de-
fendant cannot successfully assert that the complaint alleges 
a contract required to be in writing because by its terms it is 
not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor and 
is a promise to devise property (Civ. Code, § 1624(6); Code 
Civ. Proc., §1973(6)), where the contract provides that the 
life insurance policies to be furnished by the father shall he 
fully paid-up policies. 
[20] !d.-Agreements for Sale of Personal Property.-In an ac-
tion by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for 
damages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the 
father and mother for the support and education of the child, 
defendant cannot successfully assert that the complaint alleges 
a contract required to be in writing because it is one for the 
sale of personal property having a value in excess of $500 
(Civ. Code, §§ 1624a, 1724; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973a), where 
the agreement of the father is merely to furnish the money 
necessary to obtain paid-up life insurance policies to secure 
the financial obligations assumed in the contract. 
[21] Election of Remedies-Definition.-An election of remedies 
is the choosing between two or more different, coexisting and 
inconsistent modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on 
the same state of facts. 
[22] Illegitimacy-Support-Election of Remedies.-In an action 
by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for dam-
ages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the father 
and mother for the support and education of the child, defend-
ant cannot successfully assert that plaintiff made an election 
of remedies by bringing a prior action under the general sup-
port provisions of Civ. Code, § 196a, where the facts are not 
the same, in that the contract makes precise provision as to 
what shall be paid for support, and where the remedies are 
not inconsistent, in that the contract expressly provides that 
plaintiff's rights to proceed under the statute are not thereby 
abrogated. 
[23] Abatement--Pendency of Another Action.-In an action by 
an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages 
for breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and 
mother for the support and education of the child, defendant 
cannot successfully plead another action pending, where that 
action has gone to final judgment and has been affirmed on 
appeal, and where that action would not be res judicata be-
[21] See 10 Cal.Jur. 3; 18 Am.Jur. 129. 
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cause it decided only that plaintiff's action under the general 
support provisions of Civ. Code, § 196a, did not survive the 
death of his father. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Reversed. 
Action against a father's estate on a contract for support 
and education of an illegitimate child. Judgment of dismissal 
reversed. 
Maurice Rose for Appellant. 
Loeb & Loeb, Gang, Kopp & Tyre, Keating Coffey, Robert 
E. Kopp and Milton A. Rudin for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dis-
missal entered after defendants' demurrer was sustained with-
out leave to amend in an action against a father's estate on a 
contract for the support and education of an illegitimate 
child. 
Plaintiff, J ohan Richard Wallace Schumm, is a minor born 
on February 7, 1948; he prosecutes the action by his guardian 
ad litem, Kay Whyner. Defendants are the executors of the 
estate of Wallace Beery, deceased. According to the com-
plaint, the following facts appear: Plaintiff is the son of 
Beery and Gloria Schumm, neither of whom was married. 
He was conceived as the result of an act of sexual intercourse 
between Beery and Gloria on May 18, 1947. In August, 1947, 
Gloria's request of Beery that he marry her to legitimatize 
the expected child being refused, she demanded that he ac-
knowledge his paternity of the expected child or she would 
institute proceedings to have him declared the father and for 
support of the child. Beery believed, and it was a likely re-
sult, that such a suit would be damaging to his social and 
professional standing as a prominent motion picture star. 
Under these circumstances, in August, 1947, while Gloria 
was pregnant with the child (and acting as the agent of the 
child-see discussion later herein), and for his express bene-
fit, she entered into an oral agreement with Beery as follows: 
"WHEREAS, said Gloria Schumm conceived a child by said 
Wallace Beery as the result of an act of sexual intercourse 
between them in the County of Los ,Angeles, State of Califor-
nia, on or about May 18, 1947, and is now pregnant with said 
child; and 
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"WHEREAS, said Wallace Beery is a man of great wealth 
with very substantial income and well able to make adequate 
provision for the support and education of said expected child, 
suitable to Wallace Beery's circumstances, station in life and 
standard of living; and 
"WHEREAS, said Gloria Schumm is penurious, without prop-
erty or income and penniless and is unable to make any pro-
vision for the support or education of said expected child ; 
and 
"WHEREAS, Gloria Schumm is about to marry one, Hans 
Schumm; and 
"WHEREAS, neither of the parties hereto wish to impose 
upon said Hans Schumm any responsibility for the mainte-
nance and support of the said child of said Wallace Beery; and 
"WHEREAS, said Wallace Beery deems it to be to his best 
interests, social and financial, that no suit be instituted against 
him in any Court for a public adjudication that he is the 
father of said expected child and for that reason desires to 
avoid such paternity suit and the unfavorable publicity such 
suit might entail. 
"Now, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants hereof, said Wallace Beery and Gloria Schumm agree 
as follows: 
"(a) The said Gloria Schumm during the remainder of the 
period of her said pregnancy until the birth of said child shall 
institute no action or proceeding in any Court to establish 
judicially the fact that said Wallace Beery is or will be the 
father of said child. 
"(b) Upon the marriage of said Gloria Schumm and Hans 
Schumm, said expected child if born alive shall be surnamed 
'Schumm' and its name if a male shall include said Beery's 
Christian name 'Wallace,' or if a female, shall include said 
Beery's nickname 'Wally.' 
'' (c) Wallace Beery, if said child be born alive, recognizes 
and acknowledges the claim of Gloria Schumm in behalf 
of said expected child that he is morally and legally respon-
sible for the support and education of said child in a manner 
suitable to said Wallace Beery's circumstances, station in 
life and standard of living from the date of the birth of said 
child until said child shall become 21 years of age, or until 
the death of said child, whichever shall occur sooner, and the 
said Wallace Beery recognizes the claim of Gloria Schumm in 
behalf of said expected child that he is morally responsible 
to afford said child a fair start in its adult life, and that 
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considering the wealth and earning capacity of Wall ace Beery 
the sum of $25,000 would be reasonable for such purpose and 
shotud be supplied by Wallace Beery to said child for such 
start. 
"(d) Promptly upon the.birth of said child, if born alive, 
said Wallace Beery shall purchase and acquire and deliver 
to and for said child two fully paid-up policies of a Life In-
surance Company, to-wit: (1) one fully paid-up policy to be 
applied on account of the ·support and education of said 
child, whereby the Life Insurance Company shall have agreed 
to pay to said child beginning as of the date of his birth 
until he shall have reached the age of 21 years, or until his 
death, whichever occurs sooner, the sum of $100 per week; 
(2) a second fully paid-up policy on the Twenty Year Endow-
ment plan, to afford said child a fair start in its adult life, 
whereby the Life Insurance Company on said child's twenty-
first birthday, if he be then living, shall have agreed to pay 
to said child the sum of $25,000; the said child to have no in-
terest in the life insurance features, if any, of said policies, 
which shall be exclusively matters of Wallace Beery's own 
concern; provided however, that said Wallace Beery in lieu 
of said first mentioned policy to be applied on account of 
support and education may promptly on the birth of said 
child designate a Bank in the City of Los Angeles, State of 
California as Trustee, and forthwith deposit with such Trus-
tee interest or dividend bearing securities sufficient in amount 
to yield over and above the Trustee's charges and costs, a 
minimum net income of $100 per week, with provision in the 
Trust Agreement that the Trustee, beginning from the date 
of the birth of said child until the said child reaches the age 
of 21 years, or until said child's death, whichever occurs 
sooner, shall pay to said child the sum of $100 per week 
'' (e) Said child shall be maintained, supported and edu-
cated as befitting a child of a prominent public man of wealth. 
Recognizing that the child's receipts under one of said policies 
of $100 per week will be wholly inadequate to accomplish the 
desired result, even without taking into account illness of 
the child from time to time during its minority, possible acci-
dents, educational and other extraordinary unforeseen ex-
penses, it is stipulated that nothing hereinbefore stated shall 
be deemed to be an intention on the part of any of the parties 
hereto to modify, decrease or compromise the legal and moral 
obligations of Wallace Beery to his said child to provide it 
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during its minority with the necessary funds for its mainte-
nance, support and education according to the station in life 
and standard of living of Wallace Beery." 
Pursuant thereto Gloria married Hans Schumm on Au-
gust 21, 1947, and on the birth of plaintiff, gave him the 
name above mentioned including "Wallace" and the sur-
name ''Schumm''; no proceeding was instituted until after 
the birth. Beery refused to comply with any of the provi-
sions of the contract, except he paid nine weekly installments 
of $25, beginning July 6, 1948. Damages of $104,135 are 
claimed. Beery died and a claim against his estate was re-
jected. Another phase of the controversy has been decided 
on appeal. (Schumm v. Beery, 100 Cal.App.2d 407 [224 
P.2d 54].) 
[1] In support of the order sustaining the demurrer defend-
ants assert that it is alleged in the complaint that Gloria 
''acting as agent of said expected child [plaintiff] expressly 
for his benefit'' entered into the contract, that is, the contract 
was plaintiff's contract made by Gloria as his agent; that, 
therefore, it is void because ''a minor cannot give a delegation 
of power." (Civ. Code, § 33.) Plaintiff asserts, however, 
that the contract was not between him and Beery but between 
Gloria and Beery for the benefit of plaintiff as a third party 
beneficiary. (There is no dispute that recovery may be had 
on such a contract, if valid.) The matter turns, therefore, 
on whether the complaint shows such a contract. It does 
allege that the contract was made by Gloria "acting as agent" 
for the expected child. That allegation was stricken, but the 
complaint goes on to state that she entered into the contract 
"expressly for his benefit." It is said in the contract that 
Gloria and Beery ''agree'' to the then following terms. She 
agrees not to institute a paternity suit during pregnancy, 
hardly something the child could agree that she would not do. 
The whole tenor of the contract points to its being between 
Gloria and Beery for plaintiff's and Gloria's benefit. There 
are no obligations assumed by plaintiff in the contract. More-
over, it might be mentioned that under some authorities thfl 
theory of liability under a contract in favor of a third party 
beneficiary, that the contracting party-promisee was the agent 
for the beneficiary, is purely a fiction. (Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 794.) The allegations indicating agency may well refer to 
a fictional agency. The creditor's claim that was filed against 
Beery's estate states that Gloria and Beery entered into the 
contract. 
1 
I 
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[2] Defendants assert that under section 196a of the Civil 
Code, a mother of an illegitimate child has no action against 
the father for its support, but only an action in a representa-
tive capacity on behalf of the child, and that in agreeing not 
to institute a suit, plaintiff's right was bargained away, and 
therefore, plaintiff must be the contracting party, and Gloria 
acted solely in a representative capacity. There may be some 
logic in the argument, but it may also be said that she is not 
promising away plaintiff's right, as possibly she could not 
do; she is agreeing that she will not take steps to enforce it, 
and that only before the birth of the child. 
[3] Defendants point to allegations that before the con-
tract, Gloria told Beery she was going to institute suit m 
behalf of plaintiff. We see little significance in that. It 
does not necessarily show that therefore she contracted as 
plaintiff's agent. [4] Reference is also made to an allega-
tion that plaintiff and Gloria performed all the terms of the 
contract to be by them performed. But it is also alleged that 
Gloria alone did that. At most it is a stating of different 
theories. [5] If a complaint is sustainable on any theory it is 
not vulnerable to a general demurrer. (Lord v. Garland, 
27 Cal.2d 840 [168 P.2d 5].) 
[6] Defendants contend that the contract constituted a 
compromise of a minor's claim which has not been approved 
by the court pursuant to section 1431 of the Probate Code 
and is therefore invalid. This is predicated on the assertion 
that the consideration for Beery's promises was a promise 
that no action would be brought for the child's support which 
is a compromise of the plaintiff's right to support. The con-
tract does not purport to be a compromise of plaintiff's right 
to support. It will be remembered that the last sentence in 
the contract states that plaintiff's right to support is not 
abrogated or compromised by the contract. It is true that 
that clause was added to the contract by the amended com-
plaint, but that does not require that it be ignored as it is 
not contrary to the original complaint. It is merely an addi-
tional term added to a contract alleged in the origimil com-
plaint. Therefore, it is not within the alleged rule urged 
by plaintiff that facts once alleged cannot be withdrawn for 
consideration by filing an amended complaint. [7] As we 
have seen before, Gloria agreed only not to institute proceed-
ings before the birth of plaintiff. After the birth she was 
free to commence proceedings. That was not a waiver of any 
,, ,, 
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of plaintiff's rights before birth. It was only that she would 
not prosecute them. 
[8] Defendants contend that for various reasons there was 
no consideration for the contract. It is asserted that inasmuch 
as plaintiff was not bound by the contract because it was not 
approved under section 1431 of the Probate Code, Beery was 
not bound because there was no mutuality of obligation. 'fhat 
argument is predicated upon the assumption that the con-
tract was between plaintiff and Beery, which, as pointed out, 
is not the case. Plaintiff is the third party beneficiary of 
the contract and there is no performance required of him. 
Defendants assert that Gloria's promise not to institute suit 
and to name plaintiff after Beery is not consideration. We 
cannot agree with either assertion. 
On the first proposition, the argument runs to the effect 
that it is the illegitimate child's right under section 196a of 
the Civil Code to enforce the obligation of the father to 
support it; that the mother has no right except to bring the 
action in a representative capacity on the child's behalf; that, 
therefore, in agreeing not to sue she has suffered no detriment, 
for having no right, she gave up nothing; that a forbearance 
to sue on a void claim is not good consideration. [9] Before 
dealing with that contention we note defendants' claim that 
there was no promise not to institute proceedings, for the 
promise does not say no action of any kind will be instituted 
by a guardian or otherwise. The promise (quoted supra) is 
plain enough. It clearly contemplates that Gloria will not 
directly or indirectly cause litigation to be instituted involv-
ing the question of Beery being the father of the child before 
the child is born. 
[10] The mother does have a definite interest in maintain-
ing the action, for under section 196a the obligation to sup-
port is imposed upon both the mother and father. If the 
mother does not bring an action against the father and he 
refuses to give support, she will have to bear it. To the extent 
that she obtains relief against the father in such an action 
she is relieved of that burden. In agreeing to refrain 
from suing she is thereby suffering a detriment. It is not 
a case, therefore, where a person has no right of action and 
thus could not be benefited by a forbearance to prosecute an 
action. [11] Gloria had the legal right to bring an action 
after conception and before birth. (Davis v. Strottd, 52 Cal. 
App.2d 308 [126 P.2d 409] ; Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal.App.2d 122 
[100 P.2d 806]. 
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[12] Gloria's promise to name plaintiff after Beery (given 
name Wallace) was adequate consideration to support the 
contract. It was a detriment to Gloria and a benefit to 
Beery. The privilege of naming a child is valid considera-
tion for a promise. (Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218 [42 N.E. 
1127, 52 Am.St.Rep. 511]; Daily v. Minnick, 117 Iowa 563 
[91 N.W. 913, 60 L.R.A. 840]; Garclner v. Denison, 217 Mass. 
492 [105 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A.N.S. 1108]; Wolforcl v. Powers, 
85 Ind. 294 [ 44 Am. Rep. 16] ; see Green v. Green, 298 Mass. 
19 [9 N.E.2d 413]; New .Jersey Orth. Hasp. & Dispensary v. 
Wright, 95 N.J. 462 [113 A. 144] ; Freeman v. Morris, 131 
Wis. 216 [109 N.W. 983, 120 Am.St.Rep. 1038, 11 Ann.Cas. 
481] ; Babcock v. Chase, 92 Hun. 264 [36 N.Y.S. 879] ; Corbin 
on Contracts, § 127 ; Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), § 115.) 
This is in accord with the principle that the law will not 
enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the consideration. 
(6 Cal.Jur 189; Williston on Contracts (rev.ed.), § 115; Rest., 
Contracts, § 81.) Defendants attack the foregoing authorities 
by asserting that they are dicta or based upon an authority 
not in point or did not give serious consideration to the 
question of the sufficiency of the ''right to name'' as considera-
tion. They have cited no authority to the contrary, how-
ever, and two eminent authorities on contracts (Corbin and 
Williston, s~tpra) have cited them for that proposition. Reason 
supports the rule, for having a child bear its father's name 
is commonly considered a privilege and honor, and Beery 
assumed it was, for he obtained such a promise running to him. 
Merely because in the cited cases the promise was to use 
the putative father's surname does not make them distinguish-
able. [13] That is merely a matter of degree, and as seen, the 
validity of consideration does not depend on its value. 
Defendants refer to recitations in the contract that Beery 
was prominent and did not want the possible adverse publicity 
resulting from the instigation of a paternal suit. But that 
was only for the period prior to birth, and as seen, the promise 
to name the child after him was in his favor and presumably 
he considered it valuable. 
[14] The contract is not enforceable, say defendants, be-
cause the consent of Beery to it was obtained by threats of 
injury to his character. However, the complaint does not 
allege that Gloria would injure his character if he did not 
enter into the contract. It is alleged that prior to the date 
of the contract "upon the decedent's [Beery] refusal of a 
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request . . . Gloria . . . had made that the decedent by 
marrying her legitimatize said expected child, said Gloria 
Schumm demanded that the decedent, in writing or by deed 
and act, clearly acknowledge that he is the father of said 
expected child, and said Gloria . . . then intended and there 
declared to the decedent her purpose and intention, upon the 
failure of the decedent to effect such paternal acknowledg-
ment, promptly to institute in behalf of said expected child 
a suit in this [Superior] Court for a decree adjudging the 
decedent to be the father of said expected child and requiring 
decedent to make adequate and proper provision for the 
maintenance, support and education of said expected child 
before and after its birth and during its minority." She 
merely said she would commence a suit, a right she clearly had 
as hereinbefore seen. A sufference by him of unfavorable 
publicity would only be an incident of the suit. 
[15] Mixed with this contention is the claim that while 
adequacy of consideration is not important ordinarily, it is, 
where the contract is unconscionable and shocking. (See 
Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409 [71 P.2d 220].) We 
cannot say, however, that the contract falls within such a rule, 
at least on the present state of the record. It must be assumed 
(from the allegations of the complaint) that plaintiff is the 
illegitimate son of BAery; that Beery left an estate of over $2,-
000,000; that Gloria is in ''penurious circumstances''; the use 
of his name and forbearance to bring an action may have 
great intrinsic value. The obligation assumed by him is one 
imposed by law. ( Civ. Code, § 196a.) 
Defendants assert that the contract being oral is unen-
forceable because of various provisions of the statute of 
frauds. [16] First, is the provision requiring'' an agreement 
made upon consideration of marriage" to be in writing. (Civ. 
Code,§ 1624(3); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(3).) This is predi-
r,ated on the clause recited in the contract that "WHEREAS, 
Gloria is about to marry'' Schumm and neither Gloria nor 
Beery wish to impose upon him any responsibility for plain-
tiff's support; that upon such marriage plaintiff's name shall 
be "Schumm"; that Gloria and Schumm were married and 
the child so named. The amended complaint does not neces-
sarily establish that a marriage between Gloria and Schumm 
was consideration for the contract. The reference in the 
contract was merely a recital that they were about to marry 
and that no liability was to be imposed upon Schumm. 
Plaintiff was to bear Schumm's name but that includes no 
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promise to marry. It is not alleged, as asserted by defendants, 
that in performance of the contract Gloria and Schumm were 
married. Rather it is alleged that Gloria "having married 
Schumm," on plaintiff's birth, he was named Schumm. It 
then goes on to say what was done in performance of the 
contract. 
[17a] Second, the contract is within the provision requir-
ing a writing for ''a special promise to answer for the debt, 
default, or miscarriage of another, except in the cases pro-
vided for in section 2794 of the Civil Code'' (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1973(2); Civ. Code,§ 1624(2)). It is asserted that Beery 
promised to answer for the obligation of Schumm to support 
plaintiff. It is reasoned that as Gloria and Schumm were 
married when plaintiff was born, he was presumed legitimate 
and Schumm was liable for his support. Assuming the 
validity of that argument, it is predicated on the assumption 
that the promise was to plaintiff. The promise was to Gloria 
and obviously from the terms of the contract it was not to 
answer for any default of Schumm's, but was an original 
promise to Gloria. Among other reasons why the stat-
ute does not apply is the rule that a promise to answer 
for the debt of another is deemed an original obligation and 
not within the statute "Where the promise is upon a con-
sideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from 
either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another 
person." ( Civ. Code, § 2794 ( 4).) [18] The rule is stated : 
''Whenever a promise to answer an antecedent obligation 
of another is made upon a fresh consideration beneficial to 
the promisor, no matter from what source it may move, the 
promise is an original one and valid though oral; or, as was 
said in an early case, whenever the leading and main object 
of the promisor is not to become surety or guarantor of an-
other, but to subserve some purpose or interest of his own, 
his promise is not within the statute, although the effect of 
the promise may be to pay the debt or discharge the obligation 
of another." (12 Cal.Jur., 869.) (See Greenfield v. Sudden 
Lumber Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 709 [64 P.2d 1007] .) [17b] As we 
have seen, Gloria's promise to name the child after Beery and 
to refrain from instituting an action was beneficial to Beery. 
This is in line with the basic principle that: ''The important 
question, running through all cases dealing with the code 
subdivision just quoted, is whether the promises made are in 
fact assumptions of another's liability, or the primary obliga-
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tion of the promisor himself. In the former case, the promise 
is within the statute and must be in writing, but in the latter 
case the promise is valid, though verbal. The precise language 
used in making the promise is important, as a slight change in 
phraseology may have the effect of changing a promise, 
intended to be conditional and collateral, into an independent 
and original undertaking." ( 12 Cal.J ur. 864.) 
[19] Third, the contract must be in writing, state defend-
ants, for it is "by its terms not to be performed during the 
lifetime of the promisor," (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(6); Civ. 
Code, § 1624(6)) and it is a promise by Beery to devise 
property (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(6); Civ. Code, § 1624(6) ). 
The only argument advanced to support this argument is that 
the agreement as a whole shows it was a contract to devise 
property-the life insurance policies. Obviously, it is not 
such a contract. 
[20] Fourth, it is claimed that the contract is one for the 
sale of personal property (a chose in action) having a value 
in excess of $500; thus within the provision that: ''A contract 
to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of 
five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by 
action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses 
in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive 
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, 
or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in 
writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be 
charged, or his agent in that behalf. 
'' 'l'he provisions of this section apply to every such contract 
or sale, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to 
be delivered at some future time or may not at the time of such 
contract or sale be actually made, procured, or provided, or 
fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the 
making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for 
delivery; but if the goods are to be manufactured by the 
seller especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to 
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the 
provisions of this section shall not apply.'' (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1973a; Civ. Code, §§ 1624a, 1724.) The reference is to the 
provision in the contract, supra, in connection with Beery's 
promise to support, that he will purchase and deliver on the 
child's birth two paid up policies of insurance, one in which 
the insurer would pay $100 per week to the child during 
minority and the other under which the child is to receive 
$25,000 on reaching majority. 
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It should be quite clear that this was not intended as a sale. 
Beery was not an insurance company and could not "sell" 
insurance. He merely agreed to furnish the money necessary 
to obtain such policies. It is true he promises to deliver them 
but the main purpose was that he furnish the necessary funds 
in order that the protection afforded by a reputable insurer be 
secured. In lieu of the first policy a trust with a bank as 
trustee may be established. Certainly, if Beery promised to 
deposit the funds for support in a bank to Gloria's or the 
child's credit, it would not be considered a sale of a chose in 
action against the bank. The situation here is not substan-
tially different. (Even if it be assumed that a sale of the 
insurance policies was intended, it may be that the statute has 
been satisfied in that ''part payment'' takes the case out of 
the statute. Here all of the performance by Gloria has been 
performed. She has refrained from instituting the action and 
named plain tiff after Beery.) 
Finally, it is asserted that plaintiff is barred from enforcing 
the contract because he also instituted an action for support 
under section 196a of the Civil Code. That action was com-
menced before Beery's death which occurred before it was 
tried. The action was dismissed on the ground that the action 
did not survive Beery's death. That judgment of dismissal 
was affirmed. (Schumm v. Beery, supra, 100 Cal.App.2d 
407.) Defendants' argument is twofold: that by commencing 
that action plaintiff had made an election of remedies, that is, 
to enforce his right under section 196a thus abandoning 
the contract, and that the demurrer was sustainable on the 
ground that another action was pending. 
[21] As to election of remedies, plaintiff asserts that it 
cannot be raised by demurrer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430). But, 
assuming it may, the doctrine is not applicable here. The 
general rule is stated: '' 'An election of remedies is defined 
as the choosing between two or more different and coexisting 
modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same 
state of facts.' (9 R.C.L., p. 956.) 'Election of remedies has 
been defined to be the rig·ht to choose or the act of choosing 
between different actions or remedies where plaintiff has 
suffered one species of wrong from the act complained of. 
Broadly speaking, an election of remedies is the choice by a 
plaintiff to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial 
rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts, 
but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party 
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between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being 
necessarily repugnant to or a repudiation of the other.' (20 
C.J., p. 2.)" (Mansfield v. Pickwick Stages, 191 Cal. 129, 
130 [215 P. 389] .) [22] The facts are not the same nor are the 
remedies inconsistent. The instant action is on the contract, 
which makes precise provision for what shall be paid for the 
support. The other action was under the statute ( Civ. Code, 
§ 196a) which is the general obligation to support. By 
bringing the action under the statute, plaintiff did not aban-
don any right under the contract and the contract expressly 
provides that it is not an abrogation of the right under the 
statute. [23] On the claim of another action pending, that 
action has gone to final judgment-affirmed on appeal. It 
would not be res judicata ( Cf., Stevens v. Kelley, 57 Cal. 
App.2d 318 [134 P.2d 56]) for all it determined was that an 
action under section 196a does not survive the death of the 
father. 
Judgment reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 'rraynor, ,J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my view the opmwn pre-
pared for the District Court of Appeal by Mr. Presiding 
Justice Moore (reported at (Cal.App.) 224 P.2d 56) correctly 
disposes of the questions presented. For the reasons therein 
stated I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
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